- Agents don't have complete knowledge about the world.
- Agents need to make decisions based on their uncertainty.
- It isn't enough to assume what the world is like.
 Example: wearing a seat belt.
- An agent needs to reason about its uncertainty.

- Probability is an agent's measure of belief in some proposition — subjective probability.
- Example: Your probability of a bird flying is your measure of belief in the flying ability of an individual based only on the knowledge that the individual is a bird.
 - Other agents may have different probabilities, as they may have had different experiences with birds or different knowledge about this particular bird.
 - An agent's belief in a bird's flying ability is affected by what the agent knows about that bird.

Numerical Measures of Belief

- Belief in proposition, f, can be measured in terms of a number between 0 and 1 — this is the probability of f.
 - The probability f is 0 means that f is believed to be definitely false.
 - The probability f is 1 means that f is believed to be definitely true.
- Using 0 and 1 is purely a convention.
- *f* has a probability between 0 and 1, doesn't mean *f* is true to some degree, but means you are ignorant of its truth value. Probability is a measure of your ignorance.

- A random variable is a term in a language that can take one of a number of different values.
- The domain of a variable X, written dom(X), is the set of values X can take.
- A tuple of random variables ⟨X₁,..., X_n⟩ is a complex random variable with domain dom(X₁) × ··· × dom(X_n). Often the tuple is written as X₁,..., X_n.
- Assignment X = x means variable X has value x.
- A proposition is a Boolean formula made from assignments of values to variables.

- A possible world specifies an assignment of one value to each random variable.
- $\omega \models X = x$

means variable X is assigned value x in world ω .

• Logical connectives have their standard meaning:

$$\omega \models \alpha \land \beta \text{ if } \omega \models \alpha \text{ and } \omega \models \beta$$
$$\omega \models \alpha \lor \beta \text{ if } \omega \models \alpha \text{ or } \omega \models \beta$$
$$\omega \models \neg \alpha \text{ if } \omega \nvDash \alpha$$

• Let Ω be the set of all possible worlds.

For a finite number of possible worlds:

- Define a nonnegative measure μ(ω) to each world ω so that the measures of the possible worlds sum to 1. The measure specifies how much you think the world ω is like the real world.
- The probability of proposition *f* is defined by:

$$P(f) = \sum_{\omega \models f} \mu(\omega).$$

Three axioms define what follows from a set of probabilities:

Axiom 1 $0 \le P(f)$ for any formula f. Axiom 2 $P(\tau) = 1$ if τ is a tautology. Axiom 3 $P(f \lor g) = P(f) + P(g)$ if $\neg (f \land g)$ is a tautology.

• These axioms are sound and complete with respect to the semantics.

In the general case, probability defines a measure on sets of possible worlds. We define $\mu(S)$ for some sets $S \subseteq \Omega$ satisfying:

- μ(S) ≥ 0
- μ(Ω) = 1
- $\mu(S_1 \cup S_2) = \mu(S_1) + \mu(S_2)$ if $S_1 \cap S_2 = \{\}$. Or sometimes σ -additivity:

$$\mu(\bigcup_i S_i) = \sum_i \mu(S_i) \text{ if } S_i \cap S_j = \{\} \text{ for } i \neq j$$

Then $P(\alpha) = \mu(\{\omega | \omega \models \alpha\}).$

• A probability distribution on a random variable X is a function $dom(X) \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that

$$x \mapsto P(X = x).$$

This is written as P(X).

- This also includes the case where we have tuples of variables. E.g., P(X, Y, Z) means P((X, Y, Z)).
- When *dom*(*X*) is infinite sometimes we need a probability density function...

- Probabilistic conditioning specifies how to revise beliefs based on new information.
- You build a probabilistic model taking all background information into account. This gives the prior probability.
- All other information must be conditioned on.
- If evidence e is the all of the information obtained subsequently, the conditional probability P(h|e) of h given e is the posterior probability of h.

Evidence *e* rules out possible worlds incompatible with *e*. Evidence *e* induces a new measure, μ_e , over possible worlds

$$\mu_e(S) = \begin{cases} c \times \mu(S) & \text{if } \omega \models e \text{ for all } \omega \in S \\ 0 & \text{if } \omega \not\models e \text{ for all } \omega \in S \end{cases}$$

We can show $c = \frac{1}{P(e)}$. The conditional probability of formula *h* given evidence *e* is

$$P(h|e) = \mu_e(\{\omega : \omega \models h\})$$
$$= \frac{P(h \land e)}{P(e)}$$

Chain Rule

$$P(f_1 \land f_2 \land \dots \land f_n)$$

$$= P(f_n | f_1 \land \dots \land f_{n-1}) \times$$

$$P(f_1 \land \dots \land f_{n-1})$$

$$= P(f_n | f_1 \land \dots \land f_{n-1}) \times$$

$$P(f_{n-1} | f_1 \land \dots \land f_{n-2}) \times$$

$$P(f_1 \land \dots \land f_{n-2})$$

$$= P(f_n | f_1 \land \dots \land f_{n-1}) \times$$

$$P(f_{n-1} | f_1 \land \dots \land f_{n-2})$$

$$\times \dots \times P(f_3 | f_1 \land f_2) \times P(f_2 | f_1) \times P(f_1)$$

$$= \prod_{i=1}^n P(f_i | f_1 \land \dots \land f_{i-1})$$

< 🗆)

The chain rule and commutativity of conjunction $(h \land e \text{ is equivalent to } e \land h)$ gives us:

$$P(h \wedge e) = P(h|e) \times P(e)$$

= $P(e|h) \times P(h).$

If $P(e) \neq 0$, you can divide the right hand sides by P(e):

$$P(h|e) = rac{P(e|h) imes P(h)}{P(e)}$$

This is Bayes' theorem.

< 🗆)

Why is Bayes' theorem interesting?

 Often you have causal knowledge: P(symptom | disease) P(light is off | status of switches and switch positions) P(alarm | fire)

 $P(\text{image looks like } \mathbf{A} \mid \text{a tree is in front of a car})$

 and want to do evidential reasoning: P(disease | symptom) P(status of switches | light is off and switch positions) P(fire | alarm).

 $P(a \text{ tree is in front of a car} \mid image \text{ looks like } \vec{\bullet})$