Multifarious Uncertainty in Ontologies Where we are and where we might go

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multifariously adverb . multifariousness noun

ORIGIN late 16th cent.: from Latin *multifarius* + -OUS.



multifarious

adjective

our multifarious ethnic traditions: DIVERSE, many, numerous, various, varied, diversified, multiple, multitudinous, multiplex, manifold, multifaceted, different, heterogeneous, miscellaneous, assorted; literary myriad, divers. ANTONYMS homogeneous.

Motivation



Medical terminology

- Viral meningitis is a type of meningitis
- Bacterial meningitis is a type of meningitis
- Meningitis is either viral or bacterial

Motivation



Medical terminology

- Viral meningitis is a type of meningitis
- Bacterial meningitis is a type of meningitis
- Meningitis is either viral or bacterial
- Meningitis is usually not fatal
- Meningitis and caused by bacteria is usually fatal
- Meningitis affects most of skull, Dura mater is mostly made of fibre
- B. menin. is similar to v. menin., Pia mater is analogous to dura mater
- Cases of *B. meningitis* can be treated with *antibiotics*
- But Mary has meningitis and is pregnant

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Uncertainty in Ontologies

Several nuances

Exceptions: special cases, overriding of properties

meningitis, bact. meningitis

Similarity or analogy: focus on relevant aspects, tolerance

pia mater, dura mater

- Vagueness: notions of 'generally', 'rarely', 'most' meningitis rarely kills
- Incomplete information: take chances, be venturous give antibiotics to cases of meningitis
- Dynamicity: incorporate new information, backtracking

not during pregnancy

Others

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Uncertainty in Ontologies

Various takes

- Quantitative: probabilistic, statistical
- Qualitative: logical
- Combinations thereof


Uncertainty in Ontologies

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Logical approaches

- Qualitative analysis of uncertainty in reasoning
- a.k.a. nonmonotonic reasoning
- Broader than the usual understanding of NMR



Where To?

Conclusion



Overview

Where Are We?

Where To?

Conclusion

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Where To?

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Overview


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
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
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Monotonicity





 $Cn(\alpha) \subseteq Cn(\alpha \land \beta)$




In reasoning

- It means knowledge is always incremental
- Not suitable when facing uncertainty

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
Reasoning under Uncertainty



In the logic landscape

- Shares aims of non-classical logics
- But does not reject classical reasoning
- Builds on classical logic, extending it

Reasoning under Uncertainty




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Two fundamental aspects

Ampliativeness and defeasibility

Reasoning under Uncertainty



In the logic landscape

- Shares aims of non-classical logics
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Two fundamental aspects

Ampliativeness and defeasibility

Happens at three levels (at least)

Object, entailment and meta-reasoning levels

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Ampliative Aspect of Uncertainty

Allowing more conclusions by venturing beyond what is known

Default reasoning

- ▶ Jumping to conclusions: $\mathcal{T} \not\models \neg \alpha$, $\therefore \mathcal{T} \cup \{\alpha\}$ OK
- E.g.: negation as failure, closed-world assumption

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Abductive reasoning

- ▶ Finding tentative explanations: $T \not\models \alpha$, $T \cup ? \models \alpha$
- E.g.: diagnosis, forensics

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Inductive reasoning

- ► Making generalizations: $P(a), P(b), P(c), ..., \because \forall x. P(x)$ OK
- E.g.: physical laws, stereotypes

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Defeasible Aspect of Uncertainty

Allowing less conclusions by disregarding or blocking some of them

Retractive reasoning

Withdrawing conclusions already derived

$$\alpha \in Cn(\mathcal{T}) \quad i \quad \alpha \notin Cn(\mathcal{T})$$

Ex.: ontology change, dialectics

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Ex.: ontology change, dialectics

Preemptive reasoning

Preventing the derivation of some conclusion

$$\gamma \rightarrow \alpha, \ \alpha \rightarrow \beta, \ \text{not} \ (\gamma \rightarrow \beta)$$

Ex.: special cases in taxonomies, exceptions in regulations

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
Central Research Question in Uncertainty

How to sanction more conclusions and how to sanction fewer of them



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Uncertainty at the Object Level

Logical symbols of the language

Connectives can behave nonmonotonically

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Nonmonotonic version of material implication ' \sim '

• Ampliative aspect: $\alpha \rightsquigarrow \beta$ holds even if $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ doesn't

meningitis $\rightsquigarrow \neg$ fatal

▶ Defeasible (preemptive) aspect: $\alpha \rightsquigarrow \beta$ is the case but $\alpha \land \gamma \rightsquigarrow \beta$ not

meningitis \land bacterial \rightsquigarrow fatal

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 $\textit{meningitis} \land \textit{bacterial} \rightsquigarrow \textit{fatal}$

Negation in logic programming

Ampliative and retractive

Uncertainty at the Entailment Level

Sanctioned inferences or reasoning

Entailment |= behaves nonmonotonically

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Nonmonotonic version of \models

- Historically the most extensively studied
- Ampliative aspect: we may have $\{\alpha\} \models \beta$ even if $\{\alpha\} \not\models \beta$

$\{hasMeningitis(mary)\} \models AntiBioOK$

• Defeasible (retractive) aspect: $\{\alpha\} \models \beta$ is the case but $\{\alpha, \gamma\} \not\models \beta$

 $\{hasMeningitis(mary), pregnant(mary)\} \not\approx AntiBioOK$

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Uncertainty at the Meta-reasoning Level

Reasoning about sanctioned inferences

Nonmonotonicity happens 'outside' the logic

Theory change

- Theory expansion: make sure $\alpha \in Cn(\mathcal{T})$
- Theory contraction: make sure $\alpha \notin Cn(\mathcal{T})$

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Ampliative aspect

- Usually more 'conservative': primacy of new information
- Even when not conservative, not venturous enough: minimal change
- New information must follow classically from the new theory

Where To?

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Overview

Where Are We?

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Standard Logical Frameworks for Uncertainty

- Conditional logics
- Default logic
- Circumscription
- Autoepistemic logic
- AGM belief revision
- Ontology evolution
- Abstract argumentation frameworks
- Dynamic epistemic logic
- Adaptive logics
- Preferential logics

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▶ ...

Default Logic

Motivation

- Account of conclusions by default (based on absence of knowledge)
- Default rules of the form

 $\frac{\alpha:\beta,\neg\gamma}{\beta} \quad \frac{hasMeningitis(mary):AntiBioOK,\neg pregnant(mary)}{AntiBioOK}$

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Operational semantics

- Notion of *extension*: 'closure' of default rules
- Related to negation as failure

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Aspects and levels

- Both ampliative and defeasible (retractive)
- Only at the entailment level

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- Assumption that everything is normal by default
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Semantic intuition

- Minimize the extension of predicates (different policies)
- Look at some models of the premises
- $\alpha \models_{Circ(\gamma)} \beta$ if the γ -minimized α -models are β -models
- ▶ E.g. minimize extension of *pregnant* to infer *AntiBioOK*

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- Additions and removals of theorems
- Several guiding principles (postulates), e.g. minimal change
- Approaches and construction methods
 - Belief bases and belief sets
 - Partial-meet, kernels, system of spheres, etc.

Motivation

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Example

 $\mathcal{K} = \{\dots, \exists \mathsf{hasDisease.Menin(mary)}, \dots\} = \exists \mathsf{hasDisease.} \neg \mathsf{Fatal(mary)}$

Revise \mathcal{K} with \exists hasDisease.BacMenin(mary)

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Ontology Evolution

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- Ontology revision and repair
- Essentially the same as AGM ...
- ... but from a different angle (more 'operational')

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- Logic of (group) knowledge change
- Information flows via informative events:

[hasDisease.BacMenin(mary)!]

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Semantic intuition

- Epistemic possibilities held by multiple agents
- Model transformations: $\mathscr{M}_E \otimes \mathscr{M}_A \Rightarrow \mathscr{M}'_E$

 $\mathscr{M}_{E}^{\mathsf{hasDisease}.\mathsf{Menin}(\mathsf{mary})} \otimes \mathscr{M}_{A}^{\mathsf{hasDisease}.\mathsf{BacMenin}(\mathsf{mary})} \Rightarrow \mathscr{M}_{E}^{\mathsf{hasDisease}.\mathsf{Fatal}(\mathsf{mary})}$

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Aspects and levels

- ▶ Only defeasible (retractive): $\neg K \alpha \rightarrow [\alpha!] \neg K \alpha$ not valid
- Only at the object level

Preferential Logics and Rational Closure (KLM) Motivation

► Nonmonotonic conditional ~> satisfying rationality properties:

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(Ref) $\alpha \rightsquigarrow \alpha$ (LLE) $\frac{\alpha \equiv \beta, \alpha \rightsquigarrow \gamma}{\beta \rightsquigarrow \gamma}$ (And) $\frac{\alpha \rightsquigarrow \beta, \alpha \rightsquigarrow \gamma}{\alpha \rightsquigarrow \beta \land \gamma}$ (Or) $\frac{\alpha \lor \gamma, \beta \rightsquigarrow \gamma}{\alpha \lor \beta \rightsquigarrow \gamma}$ (RW) $\frac{\alpha \rightsquigarrow \beta, \models \beta \rightarrow \gamma}{\alpha \rightsquigarrow \gamma}$ (CM) $\frac{\alpha \rightsquigarrow \beta, \alpha \rightsquigarrow \gamma}{\alpha \land \gamma \rightsquigarrow \beta}$ (RM) $\frac{\alpha \rightsquigarrow \beta, \alpha \checkmark \gamma \neg \gamma}{\alpha \land \gamma \rightsquigarrow \beta}$

- Semantic intuition
 - Extra structure: *preference relation* on worlds
 - ► Notion of *minimal entailment à la* circumscription
 - Different strategies: prototypical and presumptive reasoning

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Aspects and levels

- Both ampliative and defeasible (preemptive and retractive)
- Only at the object and entailment levels

 $C - D \quad C \sqsubset E$

Preferential DLs

Defeasible subsumption

- ▶ E.g. Menin eq ¬Fatal, BacMenin eq Fatal
- Properties

$$(Cons) \top \not E \perp \qquad (Ref) C \subseteq C \qquad (LLE) \frac{C \subseteq D, C \subseteq L}{D \subseteq E}$$
$$(And) \frac{C \subseteq D, C \subseteq E}{C \subseteq D \sqcap E} \qquad (Or) \frac{C \subseteq E, D \subseteq E}{C \sqcup D \subseteq E} \qquad (RW) \frac{C \subseteq D, D \subseteq E}{C \subseteq E}$$

(CM)
$$\frac{C \subseteq D, \quad C \subseteq E}{C \sqcap D \subseteq E}$$
 (RM) $\frac{C \subseteq D, \quad C \not\subseteq \neg E}{C \sqcap E \subseteq D}$

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
Typicality operator

▶ E.g. $T(Menin) \sqsubseteq \neg Fatal, T(BacMenin) \sqsubseteq Fatal$

Preferential DLs

Semantics

- Enriched DL Interpretations $\mathcal{P} := \langle \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, \cdot^{\mathcal{I}}, \prec \rangle$
- $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $\cdot^{\mathcal{I}}$ as before
- ► ≺ is a preference (or normality) relation



Representation results: soundness and completeness of postulates


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Multifarious Uncertainty in Ontologies

Existing Frameworks: Summary

	Amp.	Def.	Obj.	Ent.	Meta.
Conditional logics	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Default logics	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark	
Circumscription	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark	
Autoepistemic logic	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark	
AGM belief change		\checkmark			\checkmark
Ontology evolution		\checkmark			\checkmark
Argumentation		\checkmark			\checkmark
DEL		\checkmark	\checkmark		
Adaptive logics	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark	\checkmark
Preferential	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	

Existing Frameworks: Summary



Not all levels and aspects have been dealt with!

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Other nonmonotonic logical symbols

- Nonmonotonic connectives
- Nonmonotonic modalities and quantifiers

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More powerful accounts of theory change

- Languages that are more expressive
- With nonmonotonic connectives

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New and more general theories of uncertainty are called for

Defeasible disjointness

Normally mutually exclusive

```
\mathsf{BacMenin} \sqsubseteq \neg \mathsf{ViralMen} \ `\mathsf{OR'} \ \mathsf{ViralMen} \sqsubseteq \neg \mathsf{BacMenin}
```

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Normally equivalent (similar, analogous?)

 $\mathsf{Cortisol}\cong\mathsf{Dexamethasone}$

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Other layers of typicality

Talk about other levels

 $T_1(Menin), T_2(Menin), \ldots, T_n(Menin)$

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Typicality for roles

Some relations are more normal than others

T(infectedBy), T(marriedTo)





Defeasible role subsumption

Normal relationship between roles

 $\mathsf{parentOf} \sqsubseteq \mathsf{progenitorOf}$



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Defeasible role properties

Holding in the most normal cases

marriedTo: usually functional, partOf: usually transitive

Allow for extra expressivity

Transfer propositional constructions to DLs, modal logics, etc

Allow for extra expressivity

- Transfer propositional constructions to DLs, modal logics, etc
- But also make use of it
 - Extra postulates beyond the Boolean ones
 - Further semantic constraints
 - (Naïve) Existential Restriction Introduction

 $\frac{C \sqsubseteq D}{\exists r. C \sqsubseteq \exists r. D}$

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$$\frac{C \sqsubseteq D}{\exists r.C \sqsubseteq \exists r.D}$$

 $\checkmark \qquad \frac{\mathsf{BacMenin} \sqsubseteq \mathsf{Fatal}}{\exists \mathsf{hasDisease}.\mathsf{BacMenin} \sqsubseteq \exists \mathsf{hasDisease}.\mathsf{Fatal}}$



Make use of extra expressivity

Existential Restriction Introduction

$$\frac{C \sqsubseteq D}{\exists r. \mathsf{T}(C) \sqsubseteq \exists r. D}$$

$$\checkmark \qquad \underbrace{\mathsf{Menin} \sqsubseteq \neg \mathsf{Fatal}}_{\exists \mathsf{hasDisease.} \mathsf{T}(\mathsf{Menin}) \sqsubseteq \exists \mathsf{hasDisease.} \neg \mathsf{Fatal}}$$

Value Restriction Introduction

 $\frac{C \sqsubseteq D}{\forall r. \mathsf{T}(C) \sqsubseteq \forall r. D}$

Make use of extra expressivity

Rational Existential Monotonicity

(REM)
$$\frac{\exists r. C \subseteq \exists r. D, \exists r. C \not\subseteq \neg \mathsf{T}(\exists r. E)}{\exists r. (C \sqcap E) \subseteq \exists r. D}$$

Rational Value Monotonicity

(RVM)
$$\frac{\forall r. C \subseteq \forall r. D, \quad \forall r. C \not\subseteq \neg \mathsf{T}(\forall r. E)}{\forall r. (C \sqcap E) \subseteq \forall r. D}$$

Instance-level ampliative and defeasible reasoning

► Let the TBox

$$\mathcal{T} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \mathsf{BacMenin} \sqsubseteq \mathsf{Menin}, \\ \mathsf{Menin} \sqsubset \neg \mathsf{Fatal}, \\ \mathsf{BacMenin} \sqsubset \mathsf{Fatal} \end{array} \right\}$$

Instance-level ampliative and defeasible reasoning

Let the TBox

$$\mathcal{T} = \begin{cases} \mathsf{BacMenin} \sqsubseteq \mathsf{Menin}, \\ \mathsf{Menin} \sqsubset \neg \mathsf{Fatal}, \\ \mathsf{BacMenin} \sqsubset \mathsf{Fatal}, \end{cases}$$

If we learn hasDisease.Menin(mary) ...

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- If we learn hasDisease.Menin(mary) ...
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Different levels of 'venturousness'

Skeptical, credulous, and in between

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Standard constructions

Usually: Strengthening the premises or relaxing the conclusions

 $\mathcal{K} \models \alpha \text{ iff } \downarrow Mod(\mathcal{K}) \subseteq Mod(\alpha)$

 $\mathcal{K} \approx \alpha \text{ iff } Mod(\mathcal{K}) \subseteq \uparrow Mod(\alpha)$

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Beyond standard constructions

- ► Go beyond the dichotomy "preferred v. non-preferred"
- Look for other notions of preferences and minimality
- New forms of reasoning beyond induction and abduction?

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Enhanced Theory Change

Beyond propositional languages

Modal logics, description logics, ...

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► Also fragments thereof (Horn, *EL*, etc.)

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Beyond classical constructors

- Makes sense for languages with nonmonotonic connectives
- A whole family of AGM-like new postulates
- ▶ Links with various ≥

Desiderata for a General Framework

Remember

The two aspects and the three levels

Desiderata for a General Framework

Remember

- The two aspects and the three levels
- But we also want a framework that
 - accounts for languages of various expressive power
 - has good balance between expressivity and computational complexity
 - is general yet elegant
 - can serve as a core formalism for further extensions
 - abides by principles of software ergonomics (usability)

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Principle

Not to diverge from existing approaches, rather build on them

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Several frameworks available

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- Formalisms general enough in the propositional case: Preferential Why?
 - Provides a general proof-theoretic characterization of \sim (and \subseteq)
 - Basis for nonmonotonic entailment pprox, e.g. *rational closure*
 - Links with AGM belief revision (inter-definability)
 - Simple and elegant (cf. our desiderata)
 - Recently extended to modal and description logics

Where To?

Conclusion



Overview

Where Are We?

Where To?

Conclusion

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Multifarious Uncertainty in Ontologies

Conclusion

What we have seen

- Uncertainty has two aspects: ampliative and defeasible
- It happens at three levels: object, entailment, and meta-reasoning
- There are still many open issues not fully addressed
- There is a need for more general theories
- We saw some possible directions to pursue

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- A thorough investigation of uncertainty in the object language
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Thank you!